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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

MFG. 9/69

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 L-04 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 H-02 SS-20 RSR-01
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ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS

S E C R E T USNATO 1009

PM RE PINCUS/PAUL TRIP

1. PINCUS AND PAUL ARRIVED IN BRUSSELS SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 15 AND DEPARTED TUESDAY MORNING, MARCH 17. ON MONDAY THEY MET WITH AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH AND USNATO STAFF; ACTING US MILREP AND STAFF; HAD LUNCH WITH DCM VEST; RECEIVED COMMAND AND THREAT BRIEFINGS AT SHAPE AND HAD LENGTHY MEETING WITH SACEUR. TUESDAY MORNING, THEY AGAIN MET WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND MEMBERS OF DEFENSE STAFF. SUMMARY REPORT OF USNATO AND USDELMC MEETINGS FOLLOWS. REPORT OF VISIT TO USNMR SHAPE WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

2. PINCUS AND PAUL WERE GENERALLY RELAXED IN APPROACH AND ASKED STANDARD PREDICTABLE QUESTIONS. THEY ALSO ASKED FOR NUCLEAR INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY DETAILS CONCERNING WORK OF

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NPG AND SOUGHT INFO ON RECENTLY AGREED TAC NUC GUIDELINES. WE REFERRED THEM TO WASHINGTON FOR RE PLIES TO ALL NUCLEAR QUESTIONS.

3. ON POLITICAL SIDE, PINCUS AND PAUL CENTERED QUESTIONS ON PROBABLE EFFECTS ON ALLIES OF SUBSTANTIAL CUT IN US TROOPS IN EUROPE. WE REPLIED THAT EUROPEANS WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF CUTS. POLITICAL STABILITY IN EUROPE HAD LASTED TWENTY FIVE YEARS. STABILITY WAS EXPENSIVE TO MAINTAIN, BUT COSTS COULDN'T BE COMPARED TO THAT OF WAR. GOVERNMENTS WERE PONDERING WAYS TO WORK OUT SECURITY SYSTEM AT LOWEST COST. VARIOUS STEPS BEING TAKEN TO LOWER TENSIONS INCLUDED BILATERAL VISITS -- EAST AND WEST; MILITILATERAL NE GOTIATIONS, INCLUDING CCD, SALT AND NPT; AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER ACTIONS, IN CLUDING FOUR POWER TALKS ON BERLIN, BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK, MBFR AND CES. ALL THESE STEPS BEING TAKEN FROM POSITION OF STRENGTH. SHOULD US MAKE UNILTERAL CUTS IN NUMBER OF TROOPS IT MAINTAINS IN EUROPE, WITHOUT REGARD TO THIS EXTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL PLAY, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DISRUPTIVE.

4. STAFF DEL ASKED WHETHER US BEGINNING CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES IN ORDER PREPARE THEM FOR "CERTAIN" FUTURE CUTS IN US TROOP LEVEL. WE TOOK LINE THAT DECISION NOT TAKEN TO CUT TROOP LEVEL, THEREFORE, NO CONSULTATION INITIATED ON THIS ASPECT WITH ALLIES. WE STRESSED PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON US COMMITMENT THROUGH FY 1971 AND LACK OF ANY POLITICAL-MILITARY JUSTIFICATION FO R CUTS IN TROOP LEVEL.

5 . STAFF DEL ASO SOUGHT EVIDENCE EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO DO MORE IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE. WE TOOK LINE THAT UEROPEANS GENERALLY DO MORE THAN THEY GIVEN CREDIT FOR, CITING RETURN OF SIXTH BRIGADE TO GERMANY AS RECENT EVIDENCE; RECALLED HEALY'S AND SCHUMANN'S STATEMENTS ON NEED MAINTAIN US FORCES AN D BRANDT'S BUNDESTAG STATEMENT CONCERNING FRG WILLINGNESS DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE MAINTAIN US FORCE LEVEL.

6. TEAM ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE PRESSURES FOR ESTABLISHMENT EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE DETECTED NO R EPEAT NO STRONG PRESSURE FOR THIS.

7. STAFF DEL ASKED FOR POLITICAL ESTIMATE OF THREAT FROM EAST. WE TOLD THEM WE SAW NO REPEAT NO P OLITICAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THESIS THAT SOVIETS PLANNING INVADE WESTERN EUROPE.

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HOWEVER, LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS ON BORDER S GAVE EUROPEANS STRONG REASON FOR UNEASE. EUROPEANS DON'T GENERALLY FEAR INVASION, BUT THEY DO FEAR POLITICAL BLACKMAIL FROM USSR, WHICH COULD FORCE THEM TO ACCEPT VERY DISADVANTAGEOUS AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIET BLOC SHOULD WEST NOT MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY STRENGTH. POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENTAL ENGAGEMENT ALSO CAN NOT BE DISCOUNTED.

8. TEAM ASKED WHETHER US SATISFIED WITH CURRENT OFFSET ARRANGEMENTS WITH FRG. WE TOOK LINE THAT CURRENT OFFSET ARRANGEMENTS WERE DESIGNED PUT OFF IMMEDIATE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS. WHILE AGREEMENT NOT PERFECT, IT PROBABLY WAS BEST THAT WE COULD NEGOTIATE AT THE TIME.

9. ON DEFENSE SIDE, TEAM CONCENTRATED QUESTIONS ON FORCE PLANNING; INFRASTRUCTURE; AIR DEFENSE, INCLUDING NADGE; AND US PERSONNEL LEVELS. WE GAVE GENERAL RUN DOWN OF MECHANICS OF FORCE PLANNING AND STATUS OF PLANNING IN CURRENT CYCLE. WE ALSO PROVIDED DETAILS OF COMPARATIVE QUALITY NATO GROUND AND AIR FORCES AGAINST CRITERIA SHAPE STANDARDS. VISITORS BRIEFED ON INFRASTRUCTURE, EMPHASIZING FAVORABLE FINANCIAL AND FACILITY POSITION US ENJOYS AS CONSEQUENCE PARTICIPATION IN NATO INFRASTRUCTURE, PARTICULARLY JOINT USE AND FUNDING OF AIRFIELDS.

10. TEAM ALSO SOUGHT INFO ON INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE. WE DESCRIBED THIS AS MATTER WITHIN SHAPE COGNIZANCE BUT RECITED LIST OF NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS CONTAINED IN ISS PUBLICATION, "THE MILITARY BALANCE" AND DPC/D(69)24. WE ALSO PROVIDED INFO ON NADGE, INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION AND FINANCIAL HISTORY, PRESENT STATUS, US PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT, AND NADGE INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE US 412L SYSTEM IN SOUTHERN GERMANY AND THE EQUIVALENT STRIDA II SYSTEM IN FRANCE.

11. IN SHORT CORDIAL SESSION WITH USDEL MC, PRIME INTEREST CENTERED AROUND MISSION AND COMPOSITION OF MC, AND MILITARY ATTITUDE OF FRENCH WITH RESPECT TO ALLIANCE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION CONCERNING CREDIBILITY OF THE MILITARY ALLIANCE IN LIGHT OF FRENCH WITHDRAWAL, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT FRENCH WITHDRAWAL HURT, BUT DOOR FOR MILITARY RE-ENTRY HAS PURPOSELY BEEN KEPT OPEN. NEXT QUESTIONS WERE ON REDCOSTE. VISITORS WERE INFORMED THAT CONSULTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE WERE CONDUCTED OUTSIDE

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MC ON BILATERAL BASIS. CONCEPT OF DUAL-BASING (E.G. REFORGER AND CRESTED CAP WHICH WERE DESCRIBED AS HAVING BEEN SUBJECT TO EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALLIES) WAS DESCRIBED FROM MILITARY POINT OF VIEW AS LESS DESIRABLE THAN HAVING UNITS IN THEATRE.

12. ONLY DOCUMENTS PROVIDED STAFF DEL WERE NPG COMMUNIQUE . IN RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTATION, WE REFERRED THEM TO SHAPE DOCUMENT, "ACE INFRASTRUCTURE DATA BOOK, SLICES I-XVIII", SEPTEMBER 23, 1968 WHICH DOD MIGHT WISH TO PROVIDE THEM IN WASHINGTON.

13. AIRGRAM FOLLOWS. GP-3.
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